This paper tests the importance of international financial assets and liabilities for consumption risk sharing in a general framework which allows for separate effects of equity and debt holdings as well as country-specific sensitivity to aggregate risk. Integration into both the international equity and debt markets is found to be an important determinant of risk sharing for OECD countries over the period 1987-2004, while integration into international equity markets is found to be a robust determinant of risk sharing for emerging and developing countries over the period 1987-2003. JEL Classification: F36, F41, G15
Introduction
The expected risk sharing benefits of financial integration have proven difficult to substantiate empirically. This paper attempts to establish the degree of consumption risk sharing that is due to cross border debt and equity assets and liabilities by running panel regressions on a large sample of rich and developing countries over the period , in a framework which relaxes some of the assumptions that have been maintained in the literature.
As pointed out by Backus and Smith (1993) , in the presence of segmented goods markets, perfect financial markets need not imply perfect cross-country consumption correlations. This means that the level of consumption correlations may be an unreliable indicator of the use of financial markets for risk sharing. This paper focusses on attempting to establish the marginal effect of debt and equity (foreign direct investment and portfolio equity) assets and liabilities on consumption correlations, rather than looking at the correlation levels. Previous studies have often combined equity and debt holdings into a single financial openness indicator. In contrast, it is argued that it may be necessary to simultaneously allow for separate risk sharing properties of debt and equity, and strong empirical support is found for this contention.
This paper also contributes to the literature by examining risk sharing in a framework which is robust to the possibility that some countries may be more exposed to "global" risk than others, and to the estimation biases to which this could lead. This generalisation of the classic risk sharing regression makes it marginally easier to detect a risk sharing effect of financial openness among OECD countries over the period 1987-2004. The regression setup used allows for a real exchange rate role in consumption dynamics, consistent with many open economy macroeconomic models. The estimation also controls for the possible effects of habit formation in consumption, whereby current consumption may depend on previous values of consumption.
The results arising from alternative methods of deflating current price data as well as alternative data sources are compared. The conclusion that financial integration does facilitate risk sharing, particularly in the period 1987-2003/4, appears robust across data sources. Section 2 reviews some empirical approaches to testing risk sharing. Section 3 develops the framework used to test for the effect of financial integration on risk sharing. Section 4 describes the data sources and empirical methodology, while Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
A classic question in international macroeconomics is whether financial integration leads to consumption risk sharing. Trade in contingent claims should enable risk sharing and the decoupling of consumption and output. Such trade should lead to an increase in cross country consumption correlations, as consumption would respond increasingly to common (aggregate) output risk rather than domestic risk. A model in the International Real Business Cycle literature which has this implication is that of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) , who also establish the lack of empirical evidence to support this prediction.
Some of the approaches to measuring consumption risk sharing and the associated empirical results are summarized in Table 1 . In the setting of Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007) , aggregate values are subtracted from the domestic series, giving "idiosyncratic" values, as the common risk represented by aggregate values is assumed to be uninsurable. The aggregate values are calculated as the average over the sample of OECD countries examined. The authors' approach allows the dependence of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic GDP to be a function of financial openness. If risk sharing occurs, increased cross-border financial holdings should allow the two idiosyncratic series to become decoupled, which should lead to a negative β 1 . This is closely related to the approach of Sorensen et al (2007) , where the coefficient of idiosyncratic output is allowed to depend on a country's equity home bias and a time trend, among other measures.
Equity Home Bias is measured as 1 -(share of country i's holdings of foreign equity in country i's total equity portfolio / the share of foreign equity in the world portfolio). Home bias is therefore zero for a country that shows no preference for equity issued domestically, and one for a country whose equity is completely domestically invested. Kose et al examine a set of 72 countries, including 51 developing countries, whereas Sorensen et al concentrate on the OECD countries. Kose et al find that financial flows help improve risk sharing by industrial countries in the globalization period (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , although the magnitude of the effect would appear small: an increase in the stock of foreign assets and liabilities equal to 100% of GDP is seen to decrease the dependence of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic output from 0.744 to 0.725. The average value of the stock of foreign assets and liabilities for the industrial countries is 265%. Cross-border financial holdings do not appear to facilitate risk sharing for emerging countries or over other periods than the globalization era.
Other studies examine variants of the above regression equation. Artis and Hoffmann (2007) run a regression in log levels instead of log differences on OECD countries over the period 1960-2000, which should capture more long term risk sharing. They find an increase in risk sharing by OECD countries in the globalization period, but also find that international financial holdings do not completely explain this increase. Bai and Zhang (2005) , following Cochrane (1991), run two cross-section regressions on a sample of 40 countries from 1973-1985 and 1986-1996 , and find that risk sharing remained static between these two periods. Following a study by Mace (1991) that examined individual level data, Bai and Zhang also run a panel regression with aggregate consumption as an explanatory variable and again find no improvement in risk sharing. The introduction of aggregate consumption on the right hand side allows a second test of risk sharing based on this coefficient, with the prediction under perfect risk sharing being a unitary coefficient.
Crucini (1999) examines a similar equation to that of Bai and Zhang (2005) , which has the growth rate of permanent income in place of that of output. Crucini finds significantly more risk sharing among the Canadian and United States than among G7 countries. Huizinga and Zhu (2004) also test an equation similar to that of Bai and Zhang, where aggregate consumption is omitted and the coefficient of GDP is allowed to depend on domestic and international equity and debt market development. They find that development of the domestic debt market is important for OECD countries, whereas development of the international market is important for non-OECD countries. The above studies primarily examine the dependence of personal consumption on GDP. Obstfeld (1995) examines the dependence of consumption on GDP net of government consumption and investment (hereinafter referred to as "net output"), rather than simply GDP. Yakhin (2004) also argues that net output is the more relevant measure for studying consumption risk. Yakhin examines G7 countries and runs crosssection regressions of consumption correlation on GDP and net GDP. The author finds that netting out government consumption and investment reverses the rank of the consumption and net output correlation coefficients for many pairs of countries, suggesting that examining net output may be important.
Several hypotheses have attempted to explain the weak empirical evidence for the risk sharing benefits of financial integration. The presence of non-tradable and durable goods may help to explain the discrepancy.
Stockman and Tesar (1995) present a model with non-traded goods, but find that this cannot reduce predicted consumption correlations to a realistic level. Lewis (1995) finds that allowing for non tradable goods in conjunction with capital market restrictions leads to the finding of some risk sharing among OECD countries, however, as the author points out, this result may be due to the low power of the test she conducts. Heathcote and Perri (2000) examine the role of market incompleteness and conclude that observed correlations match those expected under financial autarkey better than other asset structures, which begs the question of why international financial holdings continue to grow exponentially if they do not provide the expected risk sharing benefits. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007) , inter alia, suggest that the absence of financial derivatives based on a broad measure of national output may partly explain the low observed correlations, however it seems possible that such "Shiller securities" (Shiller, 1993) could be adequately proxied by a portfolio of currently available securities.
If purchasing power parity does not hold, consumption may be expected to depend on the real exchange rate. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) claim that segmented goods markets can account for low observed consumption correlations, which is one of the reasons why the present paper concentrates on finding a marginal risk sharing effect of financial integration. Ravn (2001) points out that allowing for the possible effect of the real exchange rate is necessary in consumption risk sharing regressions, since if countries face the same nominal interest rate then real exchange rate movements are equivalent to real interest rate differentials, and will lead to intertemporal substitution of consumption. Ravn regresses consumption growth on aggregate consumption growth and the growth in the real exchange rate, and finds that the real exchange rate is rarely a significant predictor, which casts doubt on the role given to it in a number of international macroeconomic models. He concludes that the data do not consistently support a role for financial markets in risk sharing, based on a sample of twelve OECD countries. His results are robust to non-separabilities in the utility function and the decomposing of consumption goods into durables, non-durables and services. Ravn also finds evidence in favour of habit persistence, although introducing lagged consumption growth to allow for this does not alter the results. The model developed below incorporates many of the features mentioned in this review, while relaxing some of the assumptions. In contrast to the approach of Kose et al (2007) among others, the exposure to aggregate risk is not assumed to be common across all countries. The risk sharing benefits of international debt and equity holdings are also allowed to differ.
Study

Sample
Findings and Remarks 
1993-2003
Strong equity home bias effect on consumption smoothing. As pointed out by Backus and Smith (1993) , perfect consumption correlation is not expected in the presence of non-traded goods, so this paper focusses on attempting to establish an effect of financial holdings on consumption correlations and hence risk sharing, as opposed to testing the null hypothesis of perfect correlation. Mace (1991) derived the equation
where ∆c at = i =j ∆c it n−1 and y it stands for household i's income at time t, as the solution to a social planning problem in the presence of common endowment shocks. In Mace's case the sum was over all households in an economy, here it is over all other countries in a sample. Aggregate consumption (and output) thus vary by country, however the country index is omitted for clarity. Under the null hypothesis of perfect risk sharing η = 1 and γ = 0. As Mace points out, the errors include preference shocks and measurement errors. 
This equation can also be seen as a generalisation of the equation examined by Kose et al (2007) , where the coefficient of aggregate output is not constrained to be −γ. This is done because some countries may display greater sensitivity to aggregate risk than others. Under perfect risk sharing and abstracting from problems such as market frictions and non-traded goods, one would expect γ = 0 and β = 1. The aggregate output series is intended to capture movements in output that are common across the OECD and potentially other countries, however the appropriate aggregate series is not known and must be estimated. Section 3.2 presents some arguments in favour of allowing the coefficients of aggregate and domestic output to differ.
It seems plausible that net output (output net of government consumption and investment) is more appropriate than output in such regressions, since consumers can only share the output remaining after government consumption and investment, as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) argue. Yakhin (2004) provides an alternative intuition: net exports can be thought of as a shock absorber for smoothing private consumption.
Regressing consumption on consumption plus the shock absorber will give a measure of the degree of risk sharing. The empirical analysis in this paper is therefore run with net output in place of output. It should be noted that for the purpose of regressions run in this paper, y refers to GDP net of investment and government consumption.
Modelling Domestic Comovement
Comovement of domestic consumption with domestic GDP may depend on financial integration. In the context of Equation (2), one possible formulation for this dependence is:
where eo it and do it designate equity (portfolio equity and FDI) and debt openness (assets plus liabilities as a proportion of GDP), respectively. Equity holdings imply state contingent returns. If a portion of the returns to output is not available to domestic consumers because it is claimed by foreign equity liability holders, this should decrease the dependence of domestic consumption on domestic output. The same is true of foreign equity assets held by domestic investors to the extent that an increase in such assets indicates less exposure to domestic equity.
Whereas equity openness may provide insurance against domestic output risk, debt assets and liabilities may allow buffer lending and saving, respectively. This would also decrease the dependence of consumption on domestic output. These considerations would lead to negative γ 1 , γ 2 . The returns to debt assets are also state contingent since default may occur and because the returns to longer term debt assets may vary with a country's monetary policy. Since the mechanisms affecting the predictions for γ 1 and γ 2 are different, it appears necessary to allow separate terms for equity and debt openness. While high debt openness indicates access to international debt markets, low openness does not necessarily imply low access, but perhaps only low utilisation, which would not rule out use of debt to buffer risk in bad times. Equity openness could also be an effective indicator of access to debt markets, which highlights the difficulty of separating the effects of debt and equity.
It may be the case that equity and debt provide alternative and not complementary methods of decoupling consumption from output. If a large portion of the returns to domestic output are claimed by foreign investors, the marginal risk sharing and buffering benefits of debt assets and liabilities may be less than for a country with low equity liabilities. Similarly, a country which can effectively buffer domestic risk may benefit less from equity portfolio diversification. For these reasons the interaction term eo it do it y it is also examined in the empirical analysis. It would be expected that this term would enter with a positive coefficient, decreasing the decoupling of consumption and net output caused by the risk sharing terms.
The estimation of the risk sharing effects of financial openness may be subject to a number of biases. It is possible that debt and equity holdings may appear to increase the dependence of domestic consumption on GDP. Suppose during some period GDP growth in excess of the long term rate (the constant should remove the long term rate from consumption growth) follows an autoregressive process. If not all consumers are forward looking, then comovement between consumption and GDP will increase during this period. More precisely, if GDP does not follow a random walk, so that E[∆y it+1 |I it ] need not equal long term growth, where I it is some information set, then in the presence of "rule of thumb" consumers (consumers who are not forward looking, in other words whose consumption varies with income), it may be expected that comovement with domestic GDP increases during periods when growth exceeds long term trend growth, and vice versa. Equity and debt holdings may also respond to such short or medium term trends, in other words
, where the tilde indicates the excess over the long term growth rate and E is the expectation operator. Kose et al (2007) note that financial flows may be procyclical, and suggest that this procyclicality may prevent consumption smoothing, presumably by the simple mechanism that there are less financial assets available for insurance when insurance is most needed.
The concern here is rather with the potential bias caused by the procyclicality of both financial holdings and domestic comovement. In periods of positive (expected) excess growth, which may also be periods of high comovement, debt and equity liabilities might increase as companies seek funding for expansion. Thus a positive association could arise between comovement and financial asset holdings, leading to positive γ 1 , γ 2 . This would constitute a bias against finding a risk sharing effect of financial openness.
Modelling Aggregate Comovement
The aggregate output term is intended to capture global risk, in other words risk to which every country is exposed. As such aggregate movements in output may also be reflected in domestic consumption. If aggregate output reflects global risk, this would suggest adopting a simpler formulation, such as that of 
Here the dependent variable is idiosyncratic consumption, that is, consumption controlling for (subtracting) its aggregate value. Supposing a negative γ, Equation (4) assumes that, under risk sharing, financial openness increases dependence on aggregate GDP to the same extent to which it decreases dependence on domestic
GDP. An alternative approach is to allow a varying effect. This could be introduced to Equation (2) by allowing the aggregate coefficient to depend on financial openness:
The reasons for allowing this freedom are:
1. The possible bias in the estimation of the coefficients of the interaction variables with domestic net GDP, γ 1 and γ 2 (discussed in the previous section), does not apply to the coefficients of the interaction variables with aggregate net GDP, β 1 and β 2 . If the bias exists, adding the constraints γ 1 = −β 1 and γ 2 = −β 2 may make it more difficult to detect a risk sharing effect than if β 1 and β 2 are unconstrained.
2. The estimation of β 1 and β 2 may be subject to a bias that does not apply to γ 1 and γ 2 , such as the possibility that periods of high domestic/aggregate comovement are associated with high financial asset holdings because high domestic/aggregate comovement is associated with stability, which could lead to an increase in foreign investment. This would bias in favour of finding risk sharing in the aggregate resource interaction variables. Constraining the coefficients may make it more difficult to detect such a bias.
3. Domestic and aggregate (global) shocks may be different in nature, aggregate shocks may for instance be more permanent (Sorensen et al, 2007) . The ability of financial holdings to insure or buffer against risk may therefore depend on the source of that risk, which would make the constraints γ 1 = −β 1 and
For these reasons the equation estimated by Kose et al (2007) and others:
is generalised to
and further to
where ΓZ it signifies other explanatory and control variables, listed below. Both equations are estimated and the results are compared. The equation is also estimated allowing for an interaction effect between risk sharing due to debt and equity assets and liabilities:
It should be noted that an "adding up constraint" may apply to the coefficient of aggregate net output. As mentioned above, y at and c at both vary by country. The constraint can be expressed as This constraint may also apply to some extent to aggregate net output, since aggregate net output is correlated with aggregate consumption. The financial openness variables still explain deviations from average comovement, but in the presence of this constraint average comovement is constrained to be unity for OECD countries. The implications of this constraint are discussed in Appendix B..
Other Explanatory Variables
The growth rate of the real exchange rate (∆r it , the Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate) is incorporated to allow for the possibility (suggested by Giannone & Reichlin (2005) and Ravn (2001) , inter alia) that consumption depends on the real exchange rate.
In the presence of risk sharing, consumption should be high in countries where prices are low. One model with this implication is that of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) , where the first order condition
is derived, with ρ standing for the coefficient of relative risk aversion and P representing the price in a common currency. This condition becomes ∆c it = ∆c at + 1 ρ ∆r it when expressed in growth rates. Because of this relation the rate of growth of the real exchange rate is added linearly to the baseline regression equations.
In order to test whether consumption in more financially integrated economies shows stronger positive dependence on the growth in the real exchange rate, which would occur if international payments allow countries to take advantage of cheap prices, the coefficient of the real exchange rate is also allowed to depend on financial openness. The risk sharing coefficients are also allowed to depend on the real exchange rate, as suggested by Sorensen in comments appended to Giannone & Reichlin (2005) .
Control Variables
The following variables are included as controls:
1. The levels of the equity and debt openness to net GDP ratios are included since the interaction model would be misspecified in their absence, as explained in Brambor et al (2006) among others. These variables are included in the three baseline specifications, whereas the remaining two control variables are not.
2. The first lag of the dependent variable is included to control for the possible effects of habit formation, as Fuhrer and Klein (2006) show that such a habit process could by itself lead to consumption correlation.
3. Trade openness is included individually and in interaction with net output as it could be a predictor of a country's ability to buffer and smooth against output fluctuations, to the extent that it proxies for a country's creditworthiness. A country that is highly integrated into the world goods market may find it easier to adjust its balance of payments to allow it to borrow in order to stabilise consumption in the face of a domestic output shock. Thus a finding that trade openness leads to decreased dependence on domestic GDP could be partly due to the use of international financial markets to buffer or hedge domestic risk. 
Price Deflators
Sorensen and Yosha (2002) argue for the use of the CPI to deflate not only consumption but also output (or net output), a practice which is followed here. Deflating output by the output deflator would eliminate changes in the purchasing power of output in terms of consumption goods. This is undesirable since the possible response of consumption to such changes is of interest here. The disadvantage of this approach is that it does not allow for adjustment to an output shock via a change in the internal terms of trade (Hoffmann, 2007) , in other words diverging consumer and producer prices. Not allowing for this channel could lead to an artificially high observed dependence of consumption on output.
Hoffmann (2007) points out that the use of an idiosyncratic price series as the deflator may be inappropriate as it fails to account for international price differentials. He observes that regional risk sharing studies generally deflate consumption and output by a common (national) consumption price deflator, whereas international studies generally deflate the series using an idiosyncratic (also national) price deflator. The first type of regression examines comovement in the values of the series, the second in the quantities. There are arguments in favour of each approach. Deflating by idiosyncratic prices fails to account for the possibility that comovement in idiosyncratic price deflated data could be due to the existence of international price differentials, and not the absence of risk sharing (and vice versa). On the other hand, deflating by a common price series may retain national price differentials that affect the degree of comovement but are not caused by and do not facilitate risk sharing. Hoffmann runs a regression using aggregate prices as the deflator, and finds that the results are closer to those seen among regional regressions. To control for the above considerations, the analysis is run on data from the Penn World Tables 6.2, which uses aggregate price series, as well as national CPI deflated data. The real exchange rate is also added as a control.
Empirical Results
There is strong evidence that financial openness leads to risk sharing as measured by the comovement of The coefficient of equity holdings in Column 2 of Table 2 implies that an increase in equity holdings equal to 100% of GDP with no accompanying change in debt openness would lead to a 96% decrease in the dependence of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic GDP. This is a larger effect than is usually found in the literature. Kose et al (2007) find that an increase in equity openness equal to 100% of GDP would decrease the dependence of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic gross output by 12%, although Sorensen Table 2 : The estimated coefficients are based on OLS regressions with country fixed effects. ∆ny it stands for the growth rate of output net of government consumption expenditure and fixed investment. The a subscript indicates aggregate, calculated over the (rest of) OECD 21 country sample. do it and eo it stand for equity and debt assets plus liabilities as percentages of GDP. ∆r it stands for the growth rate of the real exchange rate. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All panels are balanced. The four financial openness related variables are jointly significant with a p-value of 0.053 for the OECD 1973-87 sample. The same test for the non-OECD countries over 1971-86 gives a p-value of 0.12. This suggests that over the earlier samples there may be some relationship between consumption risk sharing and financial openness which is obscured by the high collinearity among the variables, however a graphical analysis of the GDP coefficient as a function of financial openness revealed no support for this possibility.
results suggest that a 100% decrease in equity home bias would lead to a greater that proportionate increase in consumption risk sharing. The authors note, however, that the equity home bias coefficient they find may not be applicable to such a large change. The debt coefficient implies that the same increase in debt holdings would lead to a 59% increase in the dependence of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic GDP.
It should be borne in mind that equity and debt openness are correlated, so that a large increase in one while the other remains constant may be unlikely. The four financial openness related variables are jointly significant at the 1% level for both samples over the later period.
The below graphs show the coefficient of idiosyncratic net GDP from Regression 1:
The values shown are β 0 + β 1 eo it + β 2 do it for levels of equity openness between 200% of GDP below and above the average level, and for debt openness equal to the average ("Debt Openness = 0") and to 100%
of GDP above the average ("Debt Openness = 1") over the relevant sample. Under perfect risk sharing, the coefficient should be zero. Under no risk sharing (or buffering), it should be one. The graphs also show confidence intervals of the coefficients. These are equal to plus or minus twice the standard error of the coefficient, calculated as the square root of:
(the coefficient and standard error formulae are adjusted as appropriate for the other regressions (2) and (3), also reported below). This method of analysis follows the suggestions of Brambor et al (2006) .
Where the growth rate of the real exchange rate is significant the sign of the estimated coefficient is negative, opposite to that predicted by theory under risk sharing in the presence of non-traded goods. The purchasing power parity exchange rate is taken as the measure of the real exchange rate (RER). An increase in the domestic price level relative to the US level will, ceteris paribus, decrease R it . The definition of RER used is R it = e it p U St pit , where e it is the number of foreign currency units per dollar, p U St is the dollar price level and p it is the foreign price level. Under risk sharing, higher domestic prices should lead to lower consumption, since the marginal benefit of a dollar of consumption is higher in a country with cheaper prices. This result may be driven by the nominal exchange rate. An increase in the nominal exchange rate could lead to higher import prices, which could affect consumption. The inclusion of financial openness interaction variables with the growth rate of the RER (eo it R it and do it R it ) does not affect the sign of the RER coefficient.
OECD countries, 1973-1986
As seen in Figure 1 , for most values of equity and debt openness, the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated coefficient encompass the x-axis. It may be that the biases discussed in Section 3.2 or the lower degree of financial integration over this period make risk sharing difficult to detect. 
OECD countries, 1987-2004
Persian Gulf States and Overseas Financial Centres
Over the period 1971-86 the debt openness interaction variable appears significant (Table 3) and consistent with buffering of output risk, but enters with a very small magnitude ( Figure 5 ). Cross-border financial holdings do not appear to have facilitated risk sharing over the period [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . The estimation of crossborder financial holdings in these countries may be subject to greater measurement error than is associated with the other two samples studied. The absence of any risk sharing effect is clearly seen in the two graphs.
The confidence intervals in Figure 5 quickly blow up, while in Figure 6 the resource coefficient as a function of equity openness is essentially a straight line.
CPI-Deflated Data
The results using CPI-deflated data are similar to those using the PWT data, however the CPI-deflated data The results for Overseas Financial Centres and Gulf States (not shown) are very similar to those using the PWT data. The similarity in the estimated coefficients across data sources suggests that international price differentials do not significantly affect risk sharing, although the inclusion of the growth rate in the real exchange rate as a control variable plays some role in explaining this similarity, as it tends to be significant mainly on the international price data. Table 3 : ∆ny it stands for the growth rate of output net of government consumption expenditure and fixed investment. The a subscript indicates aggregate, calculated over the (rest of) OECD 21 country sample. do it and eo it stand for equity and debt assets plus liabilities as percentages of GDP. r it stands for the growth rate of the real exchange rate. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. Table 4 : The results for CPI-deflated data are similar to those using PWT data (Table 2) . ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. All panels are balanced. 
Risk Sharing Regression (1), CPI-Deflated Data
Regression (2): Equity/Debt Interaction
Allowing the risk sharing effect of equity holdings to depend on the level of debt holdings (this variable could of course also be interpreted as the converse):
does not appear to offer further insights into consumption risk sharing. The debt/equity interaction term is marginally significant at the 10% level in the Non-OECD 1987-2003 sample using CPI data but not PWT data, although the two regression results give a similar picture for the dependence of the coefficient on financial openness (the relevant figures are available on request). These figures are consistent with the view that introducing this term merely introduces more noise into the estimation. The average-debt line appears to be the same as that of the Regression (1) estimation, whereas the line for above average-debt openness countries shows no clear relationship between the risk sharing coefficient and equity openness.
Regression (3): Non-Idiosyncratic Variables
This regression relaxes the assumption of an equal and opposite effect of financial openness on the dependence of consumption on domestic and aggregate GDP: decreases from 0.021 (using Regression (1)) to 0.016 (using Regression (3)). Thus, dropping the unnecessary assumption that the aggregate resource movements are always reflected in the domestic resource movements may make risk sharing slightly easier to detect, however the difference is quite trivial. The similarity of the results with and without subtracting aggregate values from domestic values reflects the fact that the aggregate series are more stable than the domestic series. Figure 8 shows that among non-OECD countries financial integration is concentrated on the liability side, which would not give domestic investors claims on aggregate net output (the graph shows average (uncentred) debt openness, but the same pattern is seen in equity openness). This may help to explain the fact that aggregate net output is not a significant predictor of domestic consumption for non-OECD countries.
Robustness Checks
All regressions are based on the OLS estimator with country fixed effects and robust standard errors. Although the financial openness variables appear to have unit roots, the errors from the regressions are sta- 
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the coefficient of aggregate consumption must be one. If the coefficient varies by country:
its average must be one.
If it is a function of financial integration, ∆c it = · · · + (β 0 + β 1 eo it + β 2 do it )∆c at + · · ·
again its average must be one.
In the absence of an adding up constraint, the interaction variables in Equation (17) would explain deviations from β 0 , which is common across countries. This remains true in the presence of the adding up constraint, but now the coefficients are constrained by β 0 + β 1 eo it + β 2 do it = 1, in other words they now explain deviations from one. As long as this interpretation is noted, the constraint poses no problem. Table 5 : Average equity and debt to GDP ratios by sample. These values were subtracted from equity and debt to GDP ratios in order to aid the interpretation of the regression coefficients.
C Average Financial Openness Values
D Net GDP Coefficients by Country
The below graph and tables show the coefficient of net output from Regression (1):
∆c it − ∆c at = α i + (β 0 + β 1 eo it + β 2 do it )(∆y it − ∆y at ) + β 3 eo it + β 4 do it + ΓZ it + ε it (18) after accounting for the effects of equity and debt openness in 2003 based on the results in Table 2 . Dependence of Consumption on Net Output Table 2 , Column (2). The red line shows the coefficient of idiosyncratic GDP for a country with average equity and debt openness.
Risk Sharing Coefficients with
